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Abstract
This paper analyzes the e¤ects of net neutrality regulation on investment incentives
for Internet service providers (ISPs) and content providers (CPs), and their implications
for social welfare. We show that the ISPs decision on the introduction of discrimination
across content depends on a potential trade-o¤ between network access fee and the
revenue from the trade of the rst-priority. Concerning the ISPs investment incentives,
we nd that capacity expansion a¤ects the sale price of the priority right under the
discriminatory regime. Because the relative merit of the rst priority, and thus its
value, becomes relatively small for higher capacity levels, the ISPs incentive to invest
on capacity under a discriminatory network can be smaller than that under a neutral
regime where such rent extraction e¤ects do not exist. Contrary to ISPsclaims that
net neutrality regulations would have a chilling e¤ect on their incentive to invest, we
cannot dismiss the possibility of the opposite.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the e¤ects of net neutrality regulation on investment incentives for
various players in the Internet market. From its inception, one of the governing principles
in the operation of the Internet has been non-discrimination requirements in all relevant
performance dimensions, as has been true for traditional telecommunication services such as
the telephone network. In 2005, however, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
changed the classication of Internet transmissions from the category of "telecommuni-
cations services" to the category of "information services." As a result, Internet service
providers (ISPs) are no longer subject to non-discrimination restrictions. In fact, major
telephone and cable operators, which together control about 98 percent of broadband ser-
vice in the US (as of December 2005),1 recently expressed an interest to provide multi-tier
Internet service, charging content providers (CPs) premium prices for preferential access to
the broadband transmission service. In response, a coalition of content providers emerged
in an e¤ort to maintain the current status of non-discrimination regime. Their intensive
lobbying e¤orts led to the hot debate known as the net neutrality debate in Washing-
ton, along with initiatives to legislate a mandate to prevent creating a multi-tier Internet
services. Even though the attempt to legislate the net neutrality regulation has failed in
Congress for now, the issue is expected to continuously arise in the future.2
On October 19, 2007, for instance, the Associated Press (AP) reported that Comcast, the
U.S.s largest cable TV operator and No. 2 Internet provider, interfered with usersaccess
to le sharing sites such as BitTorrent.3 This practice was an example of discrimination
in which ISPs intended to slow down some forms of tra¢ c while giving others priority.
Comcast may have had a benign reason for this practice so called "tra¢ c shaping" to
prevent le-sharing tra¢ c from using up too much bandwidth and a¤ecting the Internet
speeds of other subscribers.4 This interference, however, was certainly a move against the
tradition of treating all types of Internet tra¢ c equally the principle of "net neutrality."
Since one persons upload is anothers download in le-sharing networks, this type of tra¢ c
1FCC Form 477 Data.
2For detailed explanation and discussion on institutional di¤erences between the EU and U.S. concerning
net neutrality regulation, see Chirico, Van de Haar and Larouche (2007), "Network Neutrality in the EU,"
TILEC, discussion paper, DP 2007-030.
3For more detail, see "Comcast Blocks Some Internet Tra¢ c" Oct. 19, 2007, by Peter Svensson, AP.
4Peer-to-peer le-sharing applications reportedly account for about 50-90 percent of overall Internet tra¢ c
according to a survey in 2007 by ipoque GmbH, a German tra¢ c-management equipment vendor.
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management can have a series of repercussions in the network of le sharers. As a result,
the incident received nationwide attention and stirred an uproar from users of le-sharing
applications who were adversely a¤ected.
To inform this important policy debate, the paper analyzes economic issues associated
with net neutrality regulation. Considering that the Internet is a vital medium of commu-
nication, information, and commercial activities, maintaining competition and promoting
innovation in this market is of paramount importance. Policymakers thus need to act with
care and make an informed decision based on rigorous analysis to provide a market envi-
ronment in which the right investment signals are given when the Internet is involved.
Reecting the importance of the Internet as a main driver of economic growth and
prosperity in the global economy, one of the main issues of the net neutrality debate is
the innovation and investment incentive for various parties involved in the market. For
instance, ISPs such as Verizon, Comcast, and AT&T oppose network neutrality regulations
and claim that such regulations would discourage investment in broadband networks. The
logic is that they would have no incentive to invest in network capacity unless content
providers who support bandwidth-intensive multimedia Internet tra¢ c pay a premium. In
contrast, proponents of network neutrality regulations (comprising mostly consumer rights
groups and large Internet content companies such as Google, Yahoo, and eBay) note that
the Internet has operated according to the non-discriminatory neutrality principle since
its earliest days. They argue that net neutrality has been the main driver of the growth
and innovative applications of the Internet. To support their claim, they rely on the so-
called end-to-end design principle. Under this design principle, decisions are made to
allow the control and intelligence functions to reside largely with users at the edgesof the
network, rather than in the core of the network itself.5 According to them, this creates an
environment that does not require users to seek permission from the network owners and
thus promotes innovations in Internet applications.
To assess the validity of conicting claims made by opposing parties, we set up a model
that is based on the queuing theory developed in operations research. The reason for this
modeling choice is that scarce bandwidth and the potential need for rationing (due to
substantial increases in multimedia usage of the Internet) are the root causes of the debate.
The queuing theory literature has shown that assuming a constant Poisson arrival rate of
5Cerf (2006).
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content requested by each consumer generates a process that is a good approximation of
congestion in computer networks.
With the adoption of such microfoundations in a setup with a monopolistic network
operator and two application providers, we provide a formal economic analysis on the e¤ects
of net neutrality regulation on investment incentives for Internet service providers (ISPs)
and content providers (CPs), and their implications for social welfare. More specically, we
rst compare the market equilibrium in which the monopolistic ISP is allowed to provide a
two-tiered service by selling the "fast-lane" to only one content provider to the equilibrium
in which it cannot discriminate the delivery speed of content. This comparison of short-
run equilibrium yields two major ndings. First, both content providers may engage in a
Prisonersdilemma type of game to receive the rst priority in the delivery of content and
be worse o¤ in a discriminatory network. The ISPs decision of whether or not it will prefer
the discriminatory regime to the neutral network depends on a potential trade-o¤ between
its network access fee from end users and the revenue from CPs through the trade of the
rst-priority. Second, the short-run e¤ect of net neutrality regulation on social welfare
depends on the relative magnitudes of content providerscost/quality asymmetry and the
degree of content di¤erentiation. In particular, we show that social welfare is higher under
net neutrality if the asymmetry across content providers is su¢ ciently small.
Additionally and more importantly, we study the long-run e¤ects of net neutrality reg-
ulation on the ISPs investment incentives. We nd that there are two channels through
which net neutrality regulation can have impacts on the ISPsinvestment incentives: the
network access fee e¤ect and the rent extraction e¤ect. In the network with net neutrality,
capacity expansion speeds up the delivery of content uniformly, thereby enabling the ISP
to charge more for access. Similarly, in the discriminatory network, capacity expansion also
increases the delivery speed of content and thus allows the ISP to charge a higher network
fee. However, because such e¤ect occurs asymmetrically across di¤erent priority classes,
we cannot tell unambiguously under which regime the e¤ect of capacity extension is larger.
Capacity expansion also a¤ects the sale price of the priority right under the discriminatory
regime. Because the relative merit of the rst priority, and thus its value, becomes relatively
small for higher capacity levels, the ISPs incentive to invest on capacity under a discrim-
inatory network is smaller than that under a neutral regime where such rent extraction
e¤ects do not exist. As a result, the ISPs investment incentive hinges upon the relative
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magnitudes of these two potentially opposing e¤ects. Once again, it is a priori ambigu-
ous whether the ISP has greater incentive to invest in capacity in a neutral network or a
discriminatory one. Contrary to ISPsclaims that net neutrality regulations would have a
chilling e¤ect on their incentive to invest, we cannot dismiss the possibility of the opposite.
We also study the e¤ects of net neutrality regulation on application/content providers
incentives to invest in cost reduction/quality enhancement. Because the monopolistic ISP
can expropriate some of the investment benets made by content providers through the
trade of rst-priority delivery in a discriminatory network, content providers investment
incentives can be higher under the net neutrality regime. This implies that the ISPs payo¤
is not necessarily increasing in its ability to extract rents from CPs when the adverse e¤ects
on CPsinvestment incentives are taken into account. As a result, the ISP may wish to
limit its ability to extract rent, if such a commitment mechanism is available, to mitigate
the countervailing dynamic e¤ect on innovation incentives for CPs.
We thus nd that the relationship between net neutrality regulation and investment
incentives for network operators and application/content providers is subtle, and it is not
easy to draw general unambiguous conclusions. However, our model informs policymakers
and regulators by identifying important e¤ects that are expected both in the short run and
long run and showing the mechanism through which such e¤ects interact.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. The next section o¤ers
a brief literature review of papers addressing net neutrality issues. Section 3 sets up a
preliminary model of network markets to analyze the e¤ects of net neutrality regulation
on competition and social welfare. Sections 4 and 5 analyze the e¤ects of net neutrality
regulations on investment incentives of ISPs and CPs, respectively. In section 6, we provide
a brief analysis with discussion about various issues around the debate of net neutrality such
as heterogeneity in delay costs across content, quality degradation of information packets,
and vertical integration between ISP and CP. Section 7 closes this article with concluding
remarks along with suggestions for further possible extensions of our basic analysis. Most
of the proofs for lemmas and propositions are relegated to the Appendix.
5
2 Related Literature
Net neutrality regulations have been a hotly debated topic discussed with passion by both
proponents and opponents alike. The discussion so far, however, has been rich in rhetoric
but short on rigorous economic analysis. There are several notable exceptions.6
Hermalin and Katz (2007) consider a situation in which ISPs serve as a platform to
connect content providers with end consumers. As in our paper, they adopt a framework
of the so-called two-sided markets to analyze the e¤ects of net neutrality regulation. More
specically, they consider heterogeneous content providers whose products are vertically
di¤erentiated. Without any restrictions, ISPs can potentially o¤er a continuum of verti-
cally di¤erentiated services to heterogeneous content providers. They formally model the
network neutrality regulations as product line restrictions that require ISPs to provide only
one service level (a single tier of Internet service). To analyze the e¤ects of regulation, they
compare the single-service level equilibrium to the multi-service level equilibrium. They
show that net neutrality regulation has the following e¤ects. Content providers who would
otherwise have purchased a low-quality service are excluded from the market. That is, con-
tent providers at the bottom of the market the ones that a single-product restriction is
typically intended to aid are almost always harmed by the restriction. Content providers
in the "middle" of the market utilize more e¢ cient and higher quality service, which favors
the net neutrality regulation. Content providers at the top of the market utilize less e¢ -
cient and lower quality service than the one that would have been used in the absence of
regulation, which obviously favors the discriminatory network. The overall welfare e¤ect of
such regulation can be ambiguous, but they argue that the e¤ects are often negative. The
analysis of Hermalin and Katz, however, does not consider the congestion e¤ect in the pro-
vision of Internet service. More importantly, their analysis is static in the sense that they
do not investigate investment incentives of content providers and ISPs, the central concern
in the net neutrality debate. Therefore, our research thus complements that of Hermalin
and Katz (2007).
In terms of the policy questions asked as well as basic framework, our research is closest
to Cheng et al. (2006), who develop a game-theoretic model of competition between two
6See also Economides (2007) and Kocsis and de Bijl (2007). In addition, there is an extensive discussion
on net neutrality by lawyers. See, for instance, Wu (2003), Yoo (2006), and van Schewick (2007) and
references cited therein.
6
content providers in a Hotelling framework. They investigate the e¤ects of net neutrality
regulation on ISPsincentives to expand capacity in addition to addressing the question of
who gains and who loses as a result of regulation. However, there are several conspicuous
di¤erences between our paper and theirs. In this study, we intend to go one step further by
analyzing the e¤ects of the regulation on content providersincentives to provide innovative
services. We nd that the hold-up problem can prevail under a discriminatory regime and
thus ex ante the ISP might prefer to commit to the maintenance of a neutral network.
In addition, we nd somewhat di¤erent results from Cheng et al. even with a similar
framework. For instance, we nd that it is not easy to draw general clear-cut conclusions
about the relationship between net neutrality regulation and innovation incentives of either
ISPs or CPs. In contrast, they nd that if the principle of net neutrality is abandoned,
the broadband service provider denitely stands to gain from the arrangement, as a result
of extracting the preferential access fees from the content providers. Another example is
that they nd that the ISPs incentive to expand its capacity is unambiguously higher
under net neutrality, while we nd such an outcome is just one possibility. Finally, the
analysis of Cheng et al. (2006) lacks analytical consistency in the formulation of waiting
time under non-neutrality and employs somewhat ad hoc assumptions in the analysis of
capacity expansion incentives. This paper has eliminated such problems.
Economides and Tåg (2007) provide an economic analysis on net neutrality in a two-
sided market framework. The main focus in their article di¤ers from ours. They are
particularly interested in the e¤ects of net neutrality regulation on pricing schemes on both
sides of the market and on social welfare in the short run. In this paper, we discuss the
e¤ects of neutrality regulation on the playersdynamic innovation incentives. Thus, our
research strongly complements theirs.
Finally, Valletti and Cambini (2005) analyze the network operatorsincentives to invest
in networks with di¤erent quality levels, as in our paper. They show that quality has
an impact on all calls initiated by customers (destined both on-net and o¤-net) and tacit
collusion" takes place even in a symmetric model with two-part pricing because rms tend to
underinvest in quality. However, their focus is on the impact of two-way access charges on
the investment incentives in communication networks that require interconnection for o¤-net
tra¢ c whereas our analysis concerns the impacts of net neutrality regulation on investment
incentives of a network operator that serves as a platform for two-sided markets.
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3 A Model of Net Neutrality
We consider a situation in which online content providers deliver their contents to end
consumers through a broadband network that is provided by a monopolistic Internet service
provider (ISP). For instance, we can envision a specic geographic market in which Comcast
is a monopolistic ISP and content providers such as Yahoo and Google deliver their contents
at the end usersrequests.7 There is no universally accepted denition of net neutrality. For
the sake of analysis, in this paper we simply dene net neutrality as non-discrimination in
the delivery of content (packets) through the network.8
3.1 The Basic Model
The monopolistic ISP sells its network connection to end users at price a. There are two
content providers who compete to deliver content to end users. Under net neutrality, the
ISP cannot discriminate between content providers in the delivery speed of contents. For
simplicity, let us assume that under net neutrality the ISP provides content providers with
the network line at no charge.9 In contrast, without net neutrality regulation, preferential
treatment for a particular content provider is no longer prohibited. Then, the ISP can sell
the rst-priority, the right to be served ahead of the other, to either one of the two content
providers. As will be explained in further detail, we adopt a general framework that can
capture various manners in which the rst priority can be sold. In this sense, we consider
access-tiering as a practice that violates network neutrality, instead of port blocking or
quality degradation.10
As in standard queuing models, we assume that the arrival rate of each consumer fol-
lows a Poisson distribution with : The processing times of all jobs in the network are
exponentially distributed with the same mean 1=, where the service rate  is determined
by network capacity. This setup is well-known to be a very good approximation for the
arrival process in real systems, in which the number of customers is su¢ ciently large so
7Our model complements Kocsis and de Bijl (2007) that consider the situation where there is e¤ective
competition between a small number of network operators. We mention a possible extension to such a
direction in section 7.
8 In other words, we use net neutrality and non-discrimination interchangeably throughout this article.
However, see Wu (2003) who considers net neutrality as an end and non-discrimination as a mean toward
that end.
9To quote AT&T CEO Edward Whitacre, content providers "use my lines for free." See "Rewired and
Ready for Combat," Business Week Online, November 7, 2005.
10See Kocsis and de Bijl (2007) for these types of violations of net neutrality.
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that the impact of a single customer on the performance of the system is very small, and
all customersdecisions to use the system are independent of other users. In the short-run
analysis, capacity  is assumed to be xed. In the long-run analysis in which investment in-
centives are investigated, capacity  is endogenously derived. In the neutral network regime,
each packet is treated equally and delivered on a rst-come, rst-served basis. In the dis-
criminatory network regime, packets with priority class are delivered rst, ahead of any
other packets.
Consumers, whose mass is normalized to one, are heterogenous with respect to their
preferences toward two content services in the Hotelling manner. By setting CP1 and CP2
to be located at the left and right ends of a line segment whose length is normalized to one,
a consumer located at x pays the transport cost of tx and t(1   x) to consume CP1s and
CP2s services, respectively. As usual, the transport cost per unit distance, t; can represent
the degree of product di¤erentiation. As in Mendelson (1985), we assume that consumers
whose rate of content request is given by  derive a gross utility of v(= V ()) from either
content service, and this reservation value of content service is assumed to be su¢ ciently
high to ensure that the market is fully covered both in the neutral and discriminatory
networks.11
As in Cheng et al. (2006), Choi (2006), and Economides and Tåg (2007), we assume
that content providers adopt a business model that o¤ers their services without any direct
charge, but generate their revenues through advertisement. Advertisement revenues depend
on their market shares. More specically, each content provider i earns a revenue stream
r from advertisers for each consumers content request ("click-throughs") it serves. The
cost of serving each consumers request is given by ci, where 0  c1  c2 without loss of
generality.12 Thus, content provider is mark-up per each consumers click-through and the
corresponding prot per consumer are respectively given by (r   ci) and (r   ci)qi where
qi denotes the market share for content provider i.13
The sequence of the playerschoices are as follows. In the discriminatory network regime,
11Here we treat the demand parameter  as exogeneous. However, it can depend on the delivery speed of
content to end users in a more general model. For instance, it is possible that end users may abort content
requests in the face of long delays and leave the queue.
12Alternatively, we could introduce asymmetry in the revenue stream parameter r instead of the cost
parameter with the same qualitative results.
13Abstracting from direct payments between content providers and end users simplifes the analysis con-
siderably. The exploration for the implications of direct payment will be an important extension of this basic
model as explained in section 7.
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the ISP can rst sell the priority service through a trading process to one content provider;
in the neutral network this stage does not apply. Second, the ISP posts a network access
fee, a; to end users. Given the allocation of priority classes and the network subscription
fee, end users choose one of the content providers. As usual, the analysis for this game
proceeds by using backward induction, and the equilibrium concept employed here is that
of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
3.2 Preliminaries: Congestion in the M/M/1 Queuing System
To model congestion in the network, we adopt the standard framework of the M/M/1
queuing system that has been widely used by many scholars in operations research to study
congestion problems and priority pricing (See Naor, 1969; Balanchandran, 1972; Edelson
and Hilderbrand, 1975; Mendelson and Whang, 1990).14 The reason for this modeling
choice is that scarce bandwidth and the potential need for rationing (due to substantial
increases in multimedia usage of the Internet) are the root causes of the debate. This
micro-foundation yields nice properties with which we can work for our analysis without
any ad hoc assumptions.
In a neutral network where all packets are treated equally without any priority classes,
it is a standard result in the queuing theory that each consumer has the expected waiting
time of
w =
1
   (1)
where  denotes the gross arrival rate at the network (with the normalization of consumer
mass to one) and  is the capacity of the network with  > . As is intuitively expected,
the waiting time increases in ; but decreases in : If we normalize the delay cost per unit
time to one, then the expression for the waiting time equals that of the waiting cost.15
On the other hand, in the discriminatory network with two priority classes, consumers
waiting costs depend on the priority classes to which their packets are designated. In the
14See Gross and Harris (1998) for a standard reference on the queueing theory.
15 In the basic model, we assume that all content has the same delay cost per unit time. This assumption
can be relaxed by assuming heterogeneity in delay costs across content and applications. See Section 6.
10
non-preemptive discriminatory network,16 Gross and Harris (1998, pp.146-147) show that a
consumer who requests content designated to the rst-priority class has an expected waiting
time of
w1 =
1
  1 (2)
where 1 is the total amount of tra¢ c from consumers who request the content with rst-
priority.17 In contrast, the consumer who requests content without rst priority faces the
expected waiting time of
w2 =

  w1 =

  
1
  1 (3)
Based on these standard results in the queuing theory for the M/M/1 system, we can
derive intuitive results that play important roles in the subsequent analysis. First, in a
discriminatory network, a consumer experiences a longer delay by subscribing to the basic
service instead of the premium one, i.e.,
Fact 1. w2 > w > w1 for  > :
We can easily establish this fact by examining the ratio w2 to w1; i.e., w2=w1 = =( ) > 1:
As a related fact, we note that the relative ratio of w2 to w1 is a constant, regardless of the
distribution of the total tra¢ c across di¤erent priority classes.
In addition, by taking the rst derivative of waiting cost di¤erential across classes of
services with respect to the network capacity, we nd that the quality di¤erence measured
in waiting costs becomes smaller as the network capacity increases, i.e.,
Fact 2.
@
@
(w2   w1) < 0:18
This is because the marginal saving in waiting time for the fast-lane from capacity expansion
decreases as the capacity level becomes high. It is noteworthy at this stage that the above
Fact 2 will play a crucial role in some of the ndings concerning the ISPs incentive to invest
16 In discriminatory networks, there are two possible priority schemes: preemptive and non-preemptive
schemes. In the preemptive scheme, the customer request with the priority is allowed to be serviced imme-
diately, even if another without priority is already present in service. In the non-preemptive scheme, the
customer request with the priority simply goes to the head of the queue to wait its turn without interrupting
the service of a customer request already in process.
17Following convention in queuing theories, the smaller number represents the higher priority.
18 @
@
(w2   w1) =   ( 1)( )

1
 1 +
1
 

< 0:
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in network capacity.
4 Net Neutrality and ISPsInvestment Incentives
In this section, we study the e¤ects of net neutrality regulations on ISPsinvestment incen-
tives. As usual, we apply backward induction to analyze the investment incentives. We rst
analyze short-run equilibrium in the network market given network capacity . Then, we
extend the analysis to incorporate dynamic considerations since the net neutrality debate
centers around future investment and innovations,19 noticing that one of the main issues in
the debate is how the broadband operators incentive to expand capacity in infrastructure
would be a¤ected by allowing preferential transmission of content. We address this long-run
issue by investigating the ISPs marginal change in its prot with respect to the capacity
parameter :
4.1 Short-Run Analysis with a Fixed Level of Capacity
4.1.1 Equilibrium in a Neutral Network: A Benchmark Case
With the net neutrality regulation, there are no priority classes in content delivery: each
packet is treated equally on the basis of rst-come, rst-served. Each end user chooses
one of the two content providers, CP1 and CP2, that provides higher net surplus. In the
Hotelling model of end users, the marginal consumer x who is indi¤erent between two
content providers in a neutral network is dened as20
v   1
     tx
   a = v   1
     t(1  x
)  a; (4)
where consumers whose preferences are represented by x < x choose CP1 and those with
x > x choose CP2. With two symmetrically positioned content providers, the market for
content provision is equally split between the two rms with each content provider serving
half of the market, i.e., x = 1=2. We assume that v is su¢ ciently large so that it is in the
best interest of the monopolistic ISP to serve all end users.
19Wu (2003), for instance, states that "[t]he arugment for network neutrality must be understood as a
concrete expression of a system of belief about innovation (p. 145)."
20The following equality is based on the assumption that there is no direct payment from end users to
content providers, which simplies the analysis.
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The ISPs prot maximization problem is thus given by
max
a
m = a s.t. v   1
     tx
   a  0; (5)
where the constraint is needed to ensure that the market is covered. Then, we can derive
the equilibrium network subscription fee and each content providers prot as
m = a
 = v   1
    
t
2
; i =
r   ci
2
 for i = 1; 2: (6)
4.1.2 Equilibrium in a Discriminatory Network
If the ISP is allowed to charge content providers for the higher priority class, consumers will
face di¤erent expected waiting times according to their choices of content services. Let us
assume that the low-cost content provider, CP1, obtains the rst-priority. This means that
CP1s content is entitled to be served ahead of CP2s.21 Then, the consumer at ex; who
is indi¤erent between the premium service provided by CP1 and the basic service provided
by CP2, is characterized by the equality of the net surpluses from each choice:22
v   1
  ex   tex  a = v      1  ex   t(1  ex)  a: (7)
The waiting costs are based on the M/M/1 queuing system with two priority classes and no
preemption. Note that, unlike Cheng et al. (2006), a consumers waiting cost for content
without rst-priority is adversely a¤ected by the volume of priority tra¢ c. In particular, the
consumer who requests CP2s content faces a higher waiting cost than that in the neutral
network.
By comparing (4) and (7), we can derive an intuitive result that the content provider
with rst-priority has a larger market share than the one without it, i.e., ex  x = 1=2
due to the di¤erence in waiting times. The consumer located just to the right of x = 1=2
receives a discretely higher utility by choosing the content delivered at the premium rate,
but faces a marginally higher transportation cost. More consumers will keep choosing
CP1s content until the waiting cost saved by this choice is equal to the increased disutility
from the choice of lower priority content. This process may lead to a corner solution. To
21Later we demonstrate that the low-cost rm receives the priority as an equilibrium outcome.
22We use a tilde to denote variables associated with a discriminatory regime.
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see this, note that
@w2
@1
=

  
1
(  1)2 >
1
(  1)2 =
@w1
@1
> 0
The condition above states that as more consumers subscribe to the CP with the rst
priority, the waiting costs for both types of CPs increase, but the marginal e¤ect on the
waiting cost for non-priority CP is greater. As a result, we may end up a situation in
which all consumers subscribe to the CP with the rst priority.23 To prevent this outcome
from prevailing, we need that the two CPs are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated. More specically,
for the adjustment process to yield a stable interior equilibrium and the "right" signs for
comparative statics results, we assume the following condition:
 01(ex) >  02(ex) for all ex 2 [1=2; 1]; (8)
where  1(ex) = 1
  ex + tex and  2(ex) =    1  ex + t(1  ex):
By taking the derivatives of  1(ex) and  2(ex), we can explicitly write the condition (8)
as
2
(  ) (  ex)2 < 2t (9)
The following lemma species a su¢ cient condition for (9) to hold.
Lemma 1 If  > 32 ; then the stability condition holds with
2
( )( ex)2 < 2t.
Proof. Note that 
2
( )( ex)2 = ( )( ex) ( ex) = ( ex)(2ex   1)t. The last equality
comes from equation (7) that denes ex. Thus, the stability condition holds if ( ex)(2ex 
1) < 2: Notice that the LHS of the inequality above is increasing in ex whose maximum
value can be 1. It can easily be seen that if  > 32, the above inequality is satised even
for ex = 1.24
In the rest of the paper, we assume that  > 32 to focus on the stable equilibrium.
Under this maintained assumption, the following comparative statics result shows that the
23 Ironically, in this outcome no one has priority because everyone is treated equally within the priority
class.
24Alternatively, we can assume that the transportation cost parameter is su¢ ciently high that the critical
consumers location in a discriminatory network is located between 1/2 and 3/4 for the relevant parameter
values. Then, it can be shown that the condition holds.
14
market share of the CP with the priority for content delivery decreases as the ISPs capacity
increases. The main intuition for this result is that an increased capacity of ISP makes
congestion less important and reduces the relative quality di¤erential (i.e., waiting costs)
across the two CPs.
Lemma 2 dexd < 0.
Proof. By totally di¤erentiating (7), we nd the following relationship of
sign

dex
d

= sign

2
(  ) (  ex)2   2t

: (10)
By lemma (1), 
2
( )( ex)2 2t < 0 under the maintained assumption of  > 32 . Therefore,
dex
d < 0.
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In the discriminatory network, the ISPs prot is given by
max
a
em = a+ f s.t v   1
  ex   tex  a  0; (11)
where f denotes the ISPs revenue from the provision of rst-priority to CP1. We do not
specify a particular trading mechanism that determines f . Instead, we take a more general
approach that can encompass various trading protocols. When both CPs compete to acquire
the priority right, the winner is typically determined by the maximum willingness to pay.
Note that each content provider knows that its market share will be ex if it acquires the
priority right and (1  ex) if the other CP acquires the priority. Consequently, each content
providers maximum willingness to pay for the priority service is given by (r  ci)(2ex  1).
For instance, if the priority right is sold through a rst price ascending auction, CP1 will
receive the priority at the price of f = (r   c2)(2ex   1), which is the CP2s maximum
willingness to pay for the right.26 Alternatively, we can also envision a situation in which
the ISP makes sequential take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers: the ISP makes the rst o¤er to CP1 and
if it is not accepted by CP1 and it will make another o¤er to CP2. In such a scenario,
the ISP can extract all surplus from CP1 by charging f = (r   c1)(2ex   1): We adopt
25 In fact,  > 3
2
is the necessary condition under which dex
d
is dened as a real number.
26Economides (2007) discusses several consequences of the departure from net neutrality regulation based
on the auction of prioritization through which only one group of content providers is entitled to the right to
the fast lane.
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a framework that can encompass both scenarios above and the full range between them
that represents di¤erent surplus divisions between the ISP and the CP that acquires the
priority.
More specically, let  (0    1) denote the ISPs bargaining power in that it measures
the proportion of rent extraction from the low-cost content provider, CP1.27 The price of
the rst priority is given by
f j2[0;1] = (r   c1)(2ex  1)+ (1  )(r   c2)(2ex  1) (12)
= [r   c1   (1  )c2] (2ex  1)
For instance, the case where the ISP is able to extract the entire rent from the low-cost
content provider by making sequential take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers is characterized by  = 1
with f j=1 = (r   c1)(2ex   1): The other case where the right to the priority is traded
through the rst-price bid auction scheme is captured by the special case of  = 0 with
f j=0 = (r   c2)(2ex  1): All the intermediate cases are captured by some  2 (0; 1). As
expected, the more bargaining power the ISP has, the higher the priority price will be,
which is easily shown as @f@ = (c2   c1)(2ex  1)  0:
The ISPs prot in a discriminatory network thus is given by
em = v   1  ex   tex

+ [r   c1   (1  )c2] (2ex  1): (13)
When the ISP assigns the right to the fast lane to the low-cost content provider at the price
in (12), each content providers prot is respectively given by
e1 = (r   c1)ex  [r   c1   (1  )c2] (2ex  1) (14)
e2 = (r   c2)(1  ex)
4.1.3 The Short-Run E¤ects of Net Neutrality on Players
We now analyze the e¤ects of net neutrality regulation on various players. For instance,
the e¤ects of regulation on the ISPs prots can be analyzed by comparison of (6) and (13).
27We does not pin down detailed microfoundations for the bargaining process, because such an issue is
not the focus of our paper.
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We nd the following potential trade-o¤: without net neutrality the ISP earns less prot
from consumers due to the decreased network access fee (a), but gains from trading the
priority to the low-cost content provider(f).
Lemma 3 The network access fee in a discriminatory network is lower than that in a
neutral network, i.e., ea < a:
Proof. Note that a = v   1    12 t and ea = v   1 ex   tex: The di¤erence in network
access fee is given by
a   ea = 1
  ex   1   + t(ex  12): (15)
Recalling that ex is dened by (7), ex satises the equality of
t(2ex  1) = 1
  ex   : (16)
Therefore, by dividing (16) by two, then substituting (16) into (15),
a   ea = 1
  ex   1   + 12 1  ex   
=
(2ex  1)
2 (  ex) (  ) > 0 because ex > 12 :
In the absence of regulation, the ISP will choose to introduce the premium service
when its gain from prioritization is su¢ ciently high. Proposition 1 summarizes the e¤ects
of introducing two-tiered services on all parties concerned.
Proposition 1 (a) em R m i¤ r R r where r  c1+(1 )c2+ t2+ 1(2ex 1)  1 ex   1  ;
(b) e1 > 1 i¤ r   c2 < (c2   c1)(1  2);
(c) e2  2 for 8 r; ci; ; ; and
(d) Aggregate consumer welfare increases.
Proof. The statements in (a), (b), and (c) can be proved in a straightfoward manner
by comparing the expressions for prots across the regimes. Concerning the statement
in (d), let us denote the aggregate consumer welfare with the neutral network and the
discriminatory network by CS andgCS, respectively. Notice that the marginal consumers
in the neutral network and the discriminatory network are located at x = 1=2 and ex(>
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1=2), respectively, and they receive zero payo¤s. This implies that CS = 2
R 1=2
0 txdx andgCS = R ex0 txdx+ R 1 ex0 txdx. Therefore,gCS   CS = R ex1=2 txdx  R 1=21 ex txdx > 0.
Proposition 1 identies the beneciaries and losers of net neutrality regulation. Part (a)
states that the ISPs prot is higher with a discriminatory network if the advertising revenue
from consumersclick-throughs (r) is su¢ ciently high. In such a case, market share is more
important and CPs compete more aggressively to obtain the rst priority in a discriminatory
network. As a result, the ISP receives a higher price for the premium service, which can
outweigh any potential loss in access fees from end users. This also implies that unless r
is su¢ ciently high, the ISP will endogenously choose the equal treatment of both content
providers even though the net neutrality is not required. Parts (b) and (c) concern the
comparison of the CPspayo¤s under di¤erent regimes. The low-cost content provider who
obtains the rst priority can have a higher payo¤ in the discriminatory regime if the cost
di¤erential between the two content providers is su¢ ciently large. In contrast, the high-cost
content provider is always worse o¤ from the introduction of priority classes. They also
show the possibility that both content providers may engage in a Prisonersdilemma type
of game to receive the rst priority in the delivery of content in the sense that they end
up with lower payo¤s, whereas the ISP prefers a discriminatory network. This case takes
place if r > max[r; c2 + (c2   c1)(1  2)].
4.1.4 The E¤ects of Net Neutrality on Short-Run Social Welfare
With the Hotelling model for the end users, social welfare analysis of two-tiered services
is fairly straightforward: there is no demand e¤ect with pricing, as long as the market is
covered. However, there are three types of costs we need to compare to analyze the e¤ects
of two-tiered pricing on social welfare: i) total service costs, ii) total transportation costs
and iii) total delay costs. The following series of lemmas respectively examine the e¤ects of
these factors on the short-run social welfare.
First, the discriminatory regime allows the low-cost content provider to expand its mar-
ket share through speedier delivery of its content. As a result, the e¢ ciency in terms of
production cost minimization favors the discriminatory network. We can easily calculate
the cost saved under a discriminatory regime by calculating the di¤erence in total service
costs between two distinct regimes:
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Lemma 4 Total service cost under neutrality regime is higher than that under discrimina-
tory regime.
Proof. Let S and eS denote the total service cost in a neutral network and in a discrimina-
tory network, respectively.
S  S   eS = c1 + c2
2
  (exc2 + (1  ex)c1)
=
ex  1
2

(c2   c1)  0 since ex > 1=2 and c1  c2:
Second, recalling that the total transportation costs are minimized when the critical
consumer is located at the mid-point, the two-tiered pricing with ex > 1=2 is ine¢ cient in
terms of transportation cost minimization. We can easily check that the transportation cost
in the discriminatory network is higher than that in the neutral network.
Lemma 5 The transportation cost in the discriminatory network is higher than that in the
neutral network:
Proof. Let T and eT denote transaction cost in a neutral network and in a discriminatory
network, respectively.
T  T   eT = t
4
 
 Z ex
0
txdx+
Z 1
ex t(1  x)dx
!
=  (ex  1
2
)2t  0 for 8t and 1=2  ex  1:
Finally, as far as the total delay cost is concerned, we nd the following invariance
result.
Lemma 6 The total expected waiting costs are the same in both neutral and discriminatory
regimes.
Proof. We know that the expected waiting cost for each end user in a neutral network is
given by w = 1  . With the total number of end users normalized to 1, it also represents
the total expected waiting costs denoted by W , i.e., w = W = 1  : The total expected
waiting costs in a discriminatory network fW is given by the weighted average costs of
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w1 =
1
 1 and w2 =

 w1 =

 
1
 1 , with weights given by ex and (1  ex), respectively.
We also know that 1 = ex: Thus, we have
fW = exw1 + (1  ex)w2
=
1

1
  1 +

1  1



  
1
  1
=
(  1)
(  1)(  ) =
1
   =W:
As a result, the overall waiting costs are irrelevant in the static welfare comparison.
Note that this conclusion, however, depends crucially on the assumption that competing
contents have the same latency costs. If the latency costs di¤er across content, the overall
waiting costs di¤er across the regimes.28
Considering all three channels through which net neutrality can have an inuence upon
short-run total welfare, we can conclude that static welfare implications of net neutral-
ity regulations depend on the trade-o¤ between transportation cost saving and ine¢ cient
production. More specically, if the production cost asymmetry is quite small, then the
production cost e¤ect becomes negligible so that a neutral network would give a higher
static social surplus. In contrast, if the production cost di¤erence is signicant compared
to the transportation cost parameter t, a discriminatory network would be preferred from
the social surplus viewpoint. The following proposition summarizes this implication of the
net neutrality regulation on social welfare.
Proposition 2 The comparison of social welfare in the short run with and without net
neutrality regulation crucially depends on the relative magnitudes of the production cost
asymmetry and the transportation cost parameter. For a su¢ ciently small asymmetry in
production cost, the social welfare is higher under net neutrality, precisely, i¤ (c2   c1) < t
where t   ex  12 t : Otherwise, the discriminatory network yields a higher social surplus.
The proposition implies that if the two CPs are symmetric in their service cost, the
short-run social welfare is higher under net neutrality regulation.
28 In particular, the overall waiting costs would be reduced in a discriminatory regime if the content with
higher latency costs is given priority and delivered rst. See section 6 for more discussion on this.
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Example 1 Consider the case such as  = 4;  = 2; t = 1 so that ex  0:69: Assum-
ing  = 0; for simplicity, the reduction in production cost in the discriminatory network
is approximately given by 0:38(c2   c1); while the increment in transportation cost is ap-
proximately 0:036: Hence, the social welfare under net neutrality is higher than that under
discriminatory regime if and only if 0:38(c2   c1) < 0:036; obviously, for the symmetric
production cost of c1 = c2; net neutrality regulation increases the social welfare.
4.2 Long Run Analysis with Investment Incentives
Now we extend the analysis to incorporate dynamic considerations such as the broadband
operators incentive to expand capacity in infrastructure. ISPs such as Verizon, Comcast,
and AT&T oppose network neutrality regulation claiming that such regulation would dis-
courage their investment incentives in broadband networks. The intuition behind their
claims is simple: they face an obvious free-rider problem, unless content providers who
support bandwidth-intensive multimedia Internet tra¢ c pay a premium. Here we examine
the validity of this claim.
As previously mentioned, we address this issue by investigating the ISPs marginal
change in its prot with respect to the capacity parameter  for the two networks having
di¤erent governing rules for congestion. Denote () to be the cost associated with the
capacity level of  with 0  0 and 00  0: Then, the ISPs choice of optimal investment
will be determined at the point where the marginal benet and the marginal cost with
respect to  are equal to each other, i.e., dm=d = 0() in the neutral network and
dem=d = 0() in the discriminatory network. Note that the marginal benets of capacity
expansion can be written as follows by using the results above:
dm
d
=
da
d
=
1
(  )2 (17)
and
dem
d
=
dea
d
+
d ef
d
=

1
(  ex)2

1  dex
d

  tdex
d

+ 2 [r   c1   (1  )c2]dex
d
: (18)
In order to study the condition under which the ISP has a stronger incentive to invest in
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the discriminatory network, let us examine the di¤erence between (17) and (18):
dem
d
  dm
d
=

dea
d
  da
d

+
d ef
d
(19)
=

1
(  ex)2

1  dex
d

  tdex
d
  1
(  )2

| {z }
changes in the e¤ect of capacity expansion
on end user access fee with discrimination
+ 2 [r   c1   (1  )c2]dex
d| {z }
the e¤ect of capacity expansion
on the sale price of priority right
As can be seen from equation (19), there are two e¤ects in evaluating the relative
incentives to invest in capacity across the two regimes.
First, capacity expansion a¤ects the network access fee the ISP can charge end users,
which is the willingness to pay by the marginal end users. This network access fee e¤ect
is represented by the expressions in the square bracket in equation (19). More specically,
in the network with net neutrality, the location of the marginal end user does not change
and remains xed at the midpoint with a change in capacity. However, capacity expansion
speeds up the delivery of content uniformly, which enables the ISP to charge more for access.
This e¤ect is captured by the last term in the square bracket. In the discriminatory
network, capacity expansion a¤ects the delivery speed of content asymmetrically across
content providers, and thus also changes the location of the marginal consumer type who
is indi¤erent between the two content providers. Such e¤ect of capacity expansion in the
discriminatory network is captured by the rst two terms in the square bracket. In general,
we cannot tell unambiguously the relative size of this network access fee e¤ect under a
neutrality regime and under a discriminatory regime: the sign of the square bracketed term
in (19) is ambiguous.
Second, capacity expansion also a¤ects the sale price of the priority right under the
discriminatory regime. This rent extraction e¤ect, represented by the last term in equation
(19), weakens the ISPs incentive to invest in capacity under a discriminatory network
because the relative merit from rst priority and thus its value is relatively small for a
higher capacity level. In other words, since the congestion problem becomes less severe for
higher capacity levels, the ISPs rent from the allocation of priority classes also decreases,
which in turn leads to a weaker investment incentive under a discriminatory regime.
Consequently, the ISPs investment incentive hinges upon the relative magnitudes of
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these two potentially opposing e¤ects. It is a priori ambiguous whether the ISP has greater
incentive to invest in capacity in a neutral network or a discriminatory one. Contrary to
the ISPsclaim that net neutrality regulations would have a chilling e¤ect on their incentive
to invest, we cannot dismiss the possibility of the opposite. This could happen if capacity
expansion alleviates the need to acquire the priority right and hence adversely a¤ects the
ability to extract rent from content providers.
Proposition 3 The ISPs relative incentive to invest in capacity in a discriminatory net-
work vis-a-vis a neutral network depends on two e¤ects: the rent extraction e¤ect and the
network access fee e¤ect. The overall e¤ect is ambiguous. In particular, if the rent extrac-
tion e¤ect is su¢ ciently negative, the ISP may invest more on network infrastructure in a
neutral network compared to in a discriminatory one.
Example 2 Let us consider the same parameter vaules as in Example 1 such that  = 4;
 = 2; t = 1 and  = 0: Moreover, we set r = 1:5; c1 = 0 and c2 = 1 under which
the ISP prefers the discriminatory network. In this case, with some algebra, we derive
dex
d   0:197 and demd   dmd   0:244; which numerically demonstrates the possibility that
the ISP has weaker investment incentives in discriminatory network.
One interesting implication of the analysis is that degrading the non-priority packet may
be necessary to extract rent more e¤ectively and thus restore incentives to invest in the
discriminatory regime. So far, to our best understanding, the opponents of net neutrality
have claimed that they have no incentive for degradation even under the discriminatory
network.29 Nevertheless, we must be cautious in interpreting the above proposition. Our
result does not necessarily validate the claims from proponents of net neutrality regulation.
It just identies a condition under which the ISPs claim that a discriminatory network is
necessary for investment incentives may not be valid.
5 Net Neutrality and CPsInvestment Incentives
So far, our analysis has dealt only with investment incentives of ISPs. As pointed out in
von Hippel (2005), proponents of net neutrality regulation maintain that so-called killer
29For incentives to degrade the quality of a subset of products, see Denecker and McAfee, (1996) and
Hahn (2006).
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applications have been developed at the edgesof the network by users, not by the core
of network operators. Thus, another important element in the net neutrality debate is
investment incentives for content providers.
5.1 The Hold-up Problem and CPsInvestment Incentives
A typical concern about the so-called hold-up problem is that part of the return from one
partys relationship-specic investments is ex post expropriable by his trading partner. Such
concerns arise when we consider the content service providersinvestments: the monopolistic
ISP could ex post expropriate any investments made by content providers. The ex post
optimal policy for ISP to discriminate may not be optimal from an ex ante viewpoint.
Thus, an interesting question to ask is if the ISP would have the incentive to commit to net
neutrality in order to maintain the content providersincentives to invest.30
In order to examine the e¤ect of the discriminatory network on the content providers
R&D incentives, let us assume that a lower marginal cost is achieved at the expense of a
higher investment cost. An irreversible investment in cost-reducing R&D is characterized by
a twice di¤erentiable function 	(i) with 	0 > 0; 	00 > 0; where i denotes the magnitude
of the cost reduction from investing, i.e., i = ci   ci: We can think of ci as the current
best technology that is freely available to content provider i, and ci as the post-investment
cost level for i = 1; 2:
In a neutral network, each content providers marginal cost reduction increases its prot
by =2; which is readily seen from (6). This is because there is no demand e¤ect of cost-
reducing investment in the neutral network. Thus, each content providers optimal invest-
ment in cost-reducing R&D is determined by the marginal benet-cost comparison,
	0(i ) =

2
for i = 1; 2: (20)
Similarly, in a discriminatory network each content provider chooses its optimal investment
30DeGraba (1990) presents a model to study how price discrimination in a market for a variable input
a¤ects downstream producers long-run choices of a production technology. He shows that a monopoly
supplier of a variable input will charge the low-cost downstream producer a higher price than the high-cost
producer under price discrimination, and thus the downstream producers will end up choosing technology
with a higher marginal cost with price discrimination than under uniform pricing, which results in a lower
welfare in the long run under discriminatory pricing. using similar reasoning, the literature on the most
favored nations (MFN) clause in international trade also suggests that discriminatory or preferential tari¤s
rather than uniform tari¤s would have a more adverse e¤ect on investment incentives of foreign producers
(Choi, 1995).
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at the point where the marginal revenue from cost-reduction is equalized to the marginal
cost. Since the low-cost content provider earns the prot of e1 = (r   c1)ex   f where
f was dened in (12) and the high-cost content provider is not a¤ected by the ISPs rent
extraction, content providersoptimal investments are determined by
	0(e1) = (ex  (2ex  1)) and 	0(e2) = (1  ex): (21)
By the comparison of optimal investments under a neutral network with those under a
discriminatory one, we derive the following results.
Proposition 4 The low-cost content provider will choose a technology with a higher mar-
ginal cost under the discriminatory network than it will under the neutral network, i.e.;e1 < 1 if and only if the ISPs expropriation is high enough to the extent of  > 1=2.
Otherwise (0    1=2), we have e1  1. The high-cost content provider always
chooses a technology with a higher marginal cost under the discriminatory network, that is,e2 < 2:
As expected, the optimal investment level of the low-cost content provider is inversely
related to the ISPs ability to extract rent from using the fast lane. Suppose that the right
to the premium service is traded through the rst price bid auction, i.e.,  = 0: Then,
the low-cost CPs prot is constrained only by the high cost CPs willingness to pay for
the priority service. Since the low-cost CPs cost reduction applies to a larger market
coverage in a discriminatory network relative to in neutral network, the low-cost CP will
have a stronger investment incentive in a discriminatory regime. Therefore, the low cost CP
chooses a technology with a lower marginal cost under a discriminatory regime than under a
neutrality regime. Such merit, however, gradually decreases as  increases. Eventually, for
a su¢ ciently large rent extraction (for  > 1=2), the low-cost content providers investment
incentive becomes weaker under the discriminatory regime due to rent extraction from the
ISP.
On the other hand, the high-cost content provider will always choose a technology with
a higher marginal cost under a discriminatory regime for any  2 [0; 1]: This is because the
high-cost content provider always has a smaller market share in the discriminatory network
than that in the neutral network. Therefore, the ISP may have the incentive to commit to
net neutrality to maintain the content providersinnovation incentives.
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5.2 Optimal Rent Extraction: Short-Run vs. Long-Run E¤ect
Discussion in the previous subsection naturally leads us to study the optimal degree of
rent extraction in bargaining from the ISPs perspective. Consider a hypothetical situation
in which the ISP can choose the parameter . Then, we nd that there exist interesting
intertemporal trade-o¤s. First, the ISP prefers a larger rent extraction (higher ) in the
short run because of a higher surplus from trading the priority. Had we considered this
short run direct e¤ect only, the most desirable situation for the ISP is total rent extraction,
i.e.,  = 1 with @f@  0.
From the long-run perspective, however, such total extraction may not be the best
option. This is because an increase in its rent extraction can generate the adverse dynamic
e¤ect of lowering the low-cost content providers investment incentive for a higher ; which
in turn can decrease the ISPs long-run revenue from trading the priority.
Therefore, the ISPs optimal level of rent extraction will be determined by these in-
tertemporal trade-o¤s. To put it mathematically, the overall e¤ect of  on the ISPs long-run
prot is evaluated as
dem
d
=
@em
@
+
@em
@ e1 @
e1
@
; (22)
(+) (+) ( )
where the rst term captures the direct rent extraction e¤ect and the second term represents
the indirect e¤ect through CPs investment incentives. Needless to say, the ISP will choose
 by demd = 0: For an explicit solution, if we consider a quadratic function 	(i) = 2i =2k;
where k is a cost e¢ ciency parameter in the investment, then the optimal level of ; denoted
by ~; is derived in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 The ISPs long-run prot is maximized at ~ = c2 c1(2ex 1)k : The ISP does not
prefer full rent extraction, if (0 )~ = c2 c1(2ex 1)k < 1:
Corollary 1 @~@k < 0 and
@~
@(c2 c1) > 0.
As the content providers cost-reduction is more e¢ cient (or as parameter k increases),
the adverse e¤ect of the ISPs rent extraction on the low-cost content providers innovation
incentive gets large, with all other things being equal. Thus, the ISPs preferred level of
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rent extraction becomes relatively small. In addition, if the cost di¤erential between the
two content providers increases, the ISP will have a stronger incentive to extract more rent
from content providers due to the short-run direct e¤ect, ceteris paribus.
Example 3 Consider the case in Example 1, that is,  = 4;  = 2; t = 1 so that ex  0:69:
In addition, let us assume that c2 = 2, c1 = 1; and k = 5: Then, the ISP who desires to
maximize its prot, with content providers innovation incentives taken into account, will
prefer to have ~ = 1(20:69 1)5  0:526:
In reality, however, the ISP may not have the ex ante ability to commit to its preferred
level of rent extraction. In such a case, the ISP may prefer to have net neutrality regulations
as a commitment device not to extract any rent from CPs investment. The following
example shows such a possibility.
Example 4 Consider the same case as in Example 1, that is,  = 4;  = 2; t = 1 so
that ex  0:690 and dexd   0:197: In addition, let us assume that r = 3; c1 = 1, c2 = 2
and 	(i) = 12
2
i : In a neutral network, the content providers optimal investments in
cost reduction are derived as 1 = 2 = 1; which means that the ex post service costs
of content providers are given by c1 = 0 and c2 = 1: By contrast, in a discriminatory
network they are derived as ec1 = c1   e1 = 1   (1: 38   0:76) = 0:76   0:38 and ec2 =
c2   e2 = 2   0:62 = 1:38: If we calculate the prot of the ISP across di¤erent regulation
regimes taking into account this wedge in content providers investment incentives and the
resulting cost levels, the ISPs prot without commitment to network neutrality is given byem = v + 1:337 6   0:577 62 + 0:159 52; but by m = v   1 under net neutrality. Becauseem > m for 8 2 (0; 1); this example shows that the ISP is able to earn a higher prot
under net neutrality regulation than without it.
6 Discussion and Extensions
6.1 Heterogeneity in Delay Costs across Content
In the basic model, we assumed that the waiting costs due to congestion are identical across
content. However, content and applications di¤er in their sensitivity with respect to delay
in delivery. In general, data applications such as email can be relatively insensitive towards
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moderate delivery delays from the usersviewpoint. In contrast, streaming video/audio or
VoIP applications can be very sensitive to delay, leading to jittery delivery of content. With
such heterogeneity concerning delay costs, one may argue that network neutrality treating
all packets equally regardless of content is not an e¢ cient way to utilize the network in the
presence of capacity constraints. It also has been claimed by opponents of net neutrality
regulation that the imposition of net neutrality requirements may impede the development
of time-sensitive applications such as remote medical supervision.
To investigate these issues, the model needs to be modied to allow the possibility of
di¤erent latency costs across applications. More specically, let us assume  to be the
waiting cost for the low-cost content that would be provided through the fast lane, while
that for the high-cost content service is still normalized to one for consistency with the
analysis thus far. Because we are particularly interested in the case where the content with
higher latency costs is given priority and delivered rst, we focus our attention to the case
of   1.
The marginal consumer who is indi¤erent between the two content services under the
neutrality regime, denoted by x; is given by
x =
1
2
+
1  
2t(  )  x
 = 1=2; (23)
which means that under net neutrality the demand for the content with higher latency costs
decreases compared to the case of identical latency costs. In contrast, under a discriminatory
regime the location of the marginal consumer will be given by
eex = 1
2
  (  )  
2t(  )(  eex) :
By comparing eex and x; we nd that the low-cost content provider always faces a higher
demand for its content service with the rst priority relative to in a neutral network, i.e.,eex > x for any   1: The proof of this nding can be readily earned from the facts that
the di¤erence between eex and x, eex   x, increases in  and that 1 < 1; where 1 is
characterized by eex() = x(). Therefore, the qualitative results derived with identical
latency costs are quite robust to the relaxation of this assumption except with respect to
the comparison of social welfare in the short run with and without net neutrality.
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Now that there is asymmetry in latency costs across content services, Lemma 4 can-
not hold any more. In fact, it becomes possible to have lower total waiting costs under a
discriminatory regime relative to those under the neutrality regime if the asymmetry para-
meter  is su¢ ciently high. This is because the e¤ect of the rst-priority on the saving of
latency costs occurs more favorably toward the content provider who uses the faster lane,
while such asymmetrical force disappears with identical latency costs.
Proposition 6 If   2  ( 1) (1 x
)( 1)
( 1)x 1( ) where 1 =
eex; the total waiting costs
are lower under a discriminatory regime than those under a neutral regime.
As a result, the short-run welfare comparison may move toward favoring the introduc-
tion of two-tiered services in the presence of heterogeneity in delay costs across content.
Moreover, we nd the condition under which one may argue that network neutrality, which
treats all packets equally regardless of content, is not an e¢ cient way to utilize the network
in the presence of capacity constraints.
6.2 Possibility of Quality Degradation
As we pointed out early on, the ISP may want to degrade the quality of non-priority packets
(deliberately slow down the delivery speed of content) for the purpose of extracting rent
more e¤ectively and restoring incentives to invest in the discriminatory regime. In this
spirit let us consider quality degradation for the basic service by allowing the ISP to be able
to choose a waiting time higher than w2 in (3) for non-priority packets.
We nd that the ISP can have incentive to do quality degradation in a discriminatory
network, but not in a neutral network. This is because in a neutral network the ISPs quality
degradation only decreases the network access fee without yielding a higher rent extraction.
Secondly, as is obvious from the ISPs prot in the discriminatory network in (13), the low-
cost content provider will have a larger market share with such quality degradation than
without it. The enlarged asymmetry in the demands for content can make the ISP earn
more from the trade of the rst priority to the low-cost content provider, but reduce the
ISPs revenue from the network access fee. As long as the former e¤ect outweighs the latter,
the possibility of quality degradation would make discriminatory network more protable
for ISPs.
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Once again, a question of interest is how the possibility of quality degradation a¤ects
the investment incentives of the ISP. With the possibility of quality degradation, the ISP
need not to be concerned anymore about the rent extraction e¤ect that adversely a¤ects
the ISPs incentive to invest in capacity expansion. In other words, the ISP is now free of
the problem that the relative quality di¤erence between the two CPs decreases as capacity
expands. Thus, the possibility of quality degradation can increase ISPsincentives to expand
capacity.
6.3 Integration/Strategic Alliance of ISPs and CPs
Another important issue in the debate on net neutrality is the impact of integration of
ISPs and content providers on market competition and innovation incentives. One concern
expressed by net neutrality proponents is the possibility that the integrated ISPs may confer
unfair advantage to its own content over content provided by competitors. Consider, for
instance, a recent merger of AT&T with SBC that has a partnership with Yahoo. The
question is whether AT&T would have an incentive to give its partner Yahoo site preferential
treatment over competing sites such as Google in the absence of net neutrality regulations.
To address this question, we need to analyze whether the ISP may have incentives to o¤er
the rst-priority to the a¢ liated content provider over the non-a¢ liated one.
In our simple model, it turns out that under net neutrality vertical integration has no
impact on allocation of resources either in the short-run or in the long-run. Therefore, there
is no antitrust concern about vertical merger between the ISP and CP: if there is a vertical
merger, it is driven by e¢ ciency reasons. Even without net neutrality, it can be shown that
the allocation of the rst-priority is the same across di¤erent vertical structures in that the
low cost CP always receives the rst priority. Therefore, the concern that the ISP may give
its own sister division preferential treatment over competing sites is unfounded at least in
the short-run. However, vertical integration in a discriminatory regime can have impacts
on capacity investment of the ISP. To see this, let us consider a vertical merger between
the ISP and the low cost CP and denote the merged rms prot as e = ea + (r   c1)ex;
where ea = v   1 ex   tex. Then, the merged rms investment incentives can be expressed
as
de
d
=
dea
d
+ [r   c1]dex
d
: (24)
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Notice that the merged rms investment incentives do not depend on , because the
sale of the rst priority is internal to the organization.31 By comparing (24) and (18),
the comparison of investment incentives with vertical integration and without vertical in-
tegration depends on the relative magnitude of 2 [r   c1   (1  )c2] and [r   c1]. Noting
that dexd < 0, the ISPs investment incentives with vertical integration are higher than those
under no vertical integration if  is su¢ ciently high and close to 1. The reason is that with
vertical integration the ISP does not need to deliberately limit its capacity in an e¤ort to
command a higher sale price for the rst priority. However, if  is su¢ ciently small, the
result can be reversed. More specically, if r   c2 < (c2   c1)(1  2), an independent ISP
has higher incentives to invest than a vertically merged one. Note that this condition is
identical to the one that ensures that CP1 benets from a discriminatory regime. This
condition holds when the independent ISPs ability to extract rent from the sale of the rst
priority is limited and thus ISP does not fully internalize the negative impact of capacity
investment on the relative value of rst priority. Once integrated, it fully internalizes its
impact on CP1s prot and thus limits its investment to confer advantage to its own CP
division.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper provides an economic analysis of the net neutrality regulation. In particular,
our analysis focuses on the e¤ects of net neutrality regulation on the investment incentives
of ISPs and CPs as well as on social welfare. To address these questions, we use a sim-
ple model based on the queuing theory to capture the congestion in the network. We have
shown that the ISPs incentives to invest in a multi-tiered network vis-a-vis in a nondiscrim-
inatory network under net neutrality regulation depends on a potential trade-o¤ between
the two-sides of the market: the network access fee from the end users and the revenue
from content providers through the potential trade of the rst-priority in delivery. We
also compare the CPsincentives to invest in cost reduction/quality enhancement as well
as social welfare across di¤erent regulatory regimes. We nd that the relationship between
the net neutrality regulation and investment incentives is subtle. Even though we cannot
draw general unambiguous conclusions, we identied key e¤ects that are expected to play
31 If the merger took place between the ISP and the high cost CP, the incentive to invest will depend on .
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important roles in the assessment of net neutrality regulations.
We conclude by mentioning some limitations of our simple model and discussing poten-
tial avenues for future research. First, we note that the model in the previous sections
made many simplifying assumptions with regard to pricing strategies of several players.
For instance, we assumed that the ISP does not charge content providers under net neu-
trality regulations and charges only the content provider who purchases premium services
in a discriminatory network. In general, the ISP can charge content providers under net
neutrality with the restriction that they are charged the same price without any priority in
service. We also assumed away the ability of content providers to charge end users directly.
Consideration of these possibilities considerably complicates the analysis. In this regard,
the burgeoning literature on two-sided markets may be useful in further analyzing these
issues.32 In the framework of two-sided markets, ISPs will play the role of platforms that
provide a link between content providers and end users. Caillaud and Jullien (2003), for
instance, show that the equilibrium in two-sided markets depends crucially on the pricing
scheme used. Thus, it would be important to analyze the implications of allowing a more
sophisticated pricing scheme in this model. In particular, it would be an important exten-
sion to allow competition between content providers when micropayments between content
providers and consumers are possible.
Second, one may consider introducing diversity in the types of investments that can be
made by content providers. More specically, we can imagine two types of investments:
rm-specic investments, whose e¤ects are limited to the investing content providers, and
investments that have spillover e¤ects. For the rst type of investment, we can think of
investments that enhance the value of content or reduce the cost of content provision. For
the second type, we can consider an investment in compression technology, which not only
reduces the delivery speed of the investors content, but relieves congestion in the network
that helps delivery speed of other content providers. The net neutrality regulations may
have a di¤erential e¤ect across di¤erent types of investments and impact the choice of
investments.
Finally, our basic framework assumes that the ISP market is characterized by monopoly
power. This is a reasonable approximation in many geographical markets. However, it is
not the only market condition prevailing. One important extension of the model would be
32See Armstrong (2006) and Rochet and Tirole (2006) for details.
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to introduce competition in the ISP market and analyze how the e¤ects of net regulation
can play out. Most concerns expressed by net neutrality proponents are rooted in the
monopoly power and concentration in the ISP market. One important policy question
would be whether the presence of competition in the ISP market can mitigate any problems
associated with discrimination and make net neutrality regulation irrelevant.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4. Recall that 	0(i ) =

2 ; 	
0(e1) = (ex  (2ex  1)) and
	00 > 0: Thus, 1 > e1 if and only if 12 > ex   (2ex   1): Because @@ (ex  (2ex  1)) =
 (2ex  1) < 0; the condition for ex  (2ex  1) < 12 is equal to the condition for ex  (2ex 
1)   12 = (2ex   1)(12   ) < 0: Hence,  > 12 is the necessary and su¢ cient condition for
i > e1: Similarly, the comparison between 	0(2) = 2 and 	0(e2) = (1  ex) yields the
result of e2 < 2:
Proof of Proposition 5. The marginal revenue from an increase in ; the rst term
in (22), is given by @em@ = (c2   c1)(2ex   1) from (13). Note that the marginal cost-
reduction of the low-cost content provider due to a marginal increase in  is given by
@ e1
@ =  (2ex  1)k and the feedback e¤ect of cost-reduction on the ISPs prot is derived
as @em
@ e1 = (2ex 1): Thus, the boomerang e¤ect is measured by @em@ e1 @ e1@ =  (2ex 1)2k2:
Thus, the overall marginal e¤ect of the degree of rent extraction on the ISPs payo¤ is derived
as:
dem
d
= (c2   c1)(2ex  1)  (2ex  1)2k2
= (2ex  1) [(c2   c1)  (2ex  1)k] ;
from which we can see demd = 0 at ~ = c2 c1(2ex 1)k :
Proof of Proposition 6. With the heterogeneity in delay costs, in a discriminatory
network we have w1 = 
 eex and w2 =   1 eex : Thus, the total expected waiting costs are
respectively given by
f
W =
1


  eex +

1  1



  
1
  eex
=
1(  ) + (  1)
(  1)(  ) where 1 =
eex
and
W  = x

   + (1  x
)
1
   =
1 + x(   1)
   :
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The condition of W   fW is equal to that of
(1 + x(   1))(  1)  1(  ) + (  1)
()   2  (  1)  (1  x
)(  1)
(  1)x   1(  )
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